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The high mortality of over 50% in Hong Kong patients 
with pneumonia caused by the influenza A/H5N1 
virus in 1997 was found to be quite consistent in 
subsequent outbreaks in South-East Asian countries.1,2 
Our initial clinical observation was that this disease 
was not simply a viral pneumonia, and that all other 
major organs could be affected due to a cytokine 
storm caused by virus-induced aberrant immune 
activation. Fatalities were often associated with severe 
lymphopaenia, pancytopaenia, impaired coagulation 
profiles, impaired liver and renal functions in addition 
to oxygen desaturation on admission. Besides diffuse 
alveolar damage in the lungs, lymphoid atrophy and 
necrosis were prominent in the spleen and lymph 
nodes with reactive haemophagocytosis, also evident 
in bone marrow.3 Unlike seasonal influenza caused by 
the human virus, which usually can only be isolated 
in the respiratory secretions, the A/H5N1 virus can 
also be found in the blood, faeces, and cerebrospinal 
fluid.4 Thus, this so-called cytokine storm could be the 
end result of uncontrolled systemic viral infection as 
in severe septic shock due to poorly treated Gram-
negative bacteraemia.
 Human vaccination to prevent the A/H5N1 virus 
is not commercially viable because of the low number 
of human cases and the rather rapid viral antigenic 
drift. The option of antiviral therapy is very limited, 
because resistance to adamantanes is widespread in 
A/H5N1 isolates from Vietnam and Thailand. Zanamivir 
is only likely to be useful for prophylaxis in health care 
workers, because it is delivered by inhalation and 
not expected to reach therapeutic concentrations in 
extrapulmonary tissues or hypoventilated areas of 
lung consolidation. Treatment with oseltamivir did not 
obviously result in improved survival, but there was a 
trend towards better survival if given early in the course 
of illness.5 Though the poor response may have resulted 
from delayed treatment initiation, other factors might 
be equally important. These include: the non-specific 
initial manifestations of A/H5N1 infection, the high 
initial viral load, poor oral bioavailability of oseltamivir 
in seriously ill patients, lack of a parenteral preparation, 
and the ready emergence of resistance. Since the 
lymphopaenia and serum pro-inflammatory cytokine 
levels correlate directly with the viral load in respiratory 
secretions,6 it is also reasonable to consider giving 
immunomodulators to dampen the cytokine storm. 
However, the use of steroids did not improve survival 
and was associated with significant complications 
such as hyperglycaemia and superinfection.7 In fact, 
after knockout of pro-inflammatory chemokine and 
cytokine genes or treatment with steroids, A/H5N1 
virus–infected mouse models showed no significant 
improved survival.8 Due to the low incidence of 
this important disease, randomised controlled 
clinical trials are unlikely to be conducted. However, 
data from mice models suggest that high dose of 
oseltamivir therapy prolonged to more than 8 days,9 
combination of oseltamivir with amantadine,10 and 
use of high titres of neutralising monoclonal antibody 
or convalescent plasma, may improve survival.11 
Recently, we combined the systemic administration 
of zanamivir with the COX-2 inhibitor celecoxib and 
mesalazine to treat mice inoculated with a high dose 
of A/H5N1 virus.12 Despite delayed therapy initiation 
of up to 48 hours after inoculation, this combination 
significantly reduced the viral load, production of pro-
inflammatory cytokines, chemokines, leukotrienes, 
as well as mortality. The inhibitory activities of these 
non-steroidal anti-inflammatory agents against the 
pro-inflammatory response, together with the anti-
apoptotic activities of the aminosalicylate, reduced cell 
death and tissue damage in the host. The concomitant 
use of an effective antiviral is essential, not only to 
limit the extent of viral replication that drives the 
cytokine dysfunction triggered by the infection, but 
also to counteract the possible increase in viral load 
after COX-2 inhibition. Notably, these drugs are widely 
available and intravenous zanamivir has been used in 
humans with little in the way of side-effects.13-15
 However, prevention is always better than cure. 
No developed nation in the world is really prepared 
for a 1918-like pandemic influenza. In the absence of 
efficient inter-personal spread of the A/H5N1 virus, 
preventing major outbreaks of human infection relies 
on controlling its endemicity in poultry. This entails 
prevention and prompt management of outbreaks in 
poultry, separation of poultry from humans to minimise 
transmission to them, and proper management of 
occasional human infections. At the height of the 
1997 outbreak in Hong Kong, 20% of the poultry in 
wet markets were infected by the virus. Control of 
the outbreak ensued after culling of all the 1.5 million 
poultry throughout Hong Kong. Sale of live ducks and 
geese in wet markets was banned, as these birds can 
shed the virus asymptomatically. Biosecurity measures 
in local farms were strictly enforced, and a bi-weekly 
rest day with cleansing of all the poultry stalls was 
introduced to interrupt the transmission cycle in wet 
markets. Vaccination against influenza A/H5 infection 
was required for all poultry in local farms and farms 
supplying live poultry to Hong Kong from Mainland 
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China. These stringent measures appeared successful 
in preventing the incursion of the virus into local 
farms and markets for several years. Unfortunately, 
we cannot prevent the expected antigenic drift 
which will overcome the protection conferred by the 
poultry vaccine and thus require changes in vaccine 
according to the dominant endemic viral strain at 
that time. Complete elimination of illegal poultry 
imports into Hong Kong from unregistered farms in 
the Mainland is unlikely to be successful. Moreover, 
chicken stalls in wet markets may be regarded as mini-
farms, where biosecurity measures comparable to 
those imposed on recognised farms are impossible to 
implement. Thus, the final answer depends on central 
slaughtering, which eliminates any potential contact of 
live poultry with the general population. In the interim 
before central slaughtering is launched, daily culling 
of all unsold chickens can be expected to stop viral 
shedding from newly infected chickens. The latter 
may not stay in the market long enough to exceed the 
incubation period for viral shedding. However, such 
measures cannot stop viral shedding from illegally 
imported infected chickens.
 Control of avian influenza outbreaks in 
poultry in developing countries poses even more 
formidable problems. The rising demand for meat 
protein associated with the improving open-door 
economy in South-East Asia is responsible for a 
tremendous increase in poultry farming. Regrettably, 
no corresponding improvement in the biosecurity 
measures have followed in the ensuing profligation 
of farms and markets, and over half of such poultry 
are reared in backyard premises. Theoretically, 
country-wide veterinary and virological surveillance 
of birds, perimetric depopulation of infected zones, 
and targeted immunisation of poultry with correct 
vaccines could all be helpful. Other potentially useful 
measures include: segregation of poultry species, 
regular moratoria of poultry in the markets, and the 
implementation of biosecurity and hygienic practices 
in farms, markets, and at a personal level might also 
help to control poultry pandemic. How many of these 
measures are practicable is questionable. Alternatively, 
lesser scale interventions at the district level can be 
considered in response to local virus detection even 
without evidence of excess poultry deaths, since virus 
shedding is common in asymptomatic water fowl. To 
reduce the environmental viral load and therefore the 
risk of re-infection of farmed poultry, a planned one-
off moratorium of 3 weeks during the hottest months 
of the year may be an important measure, as shown by 
mathematical modelling.16 Backyard farms will then be 
re-populated by hatchlings from virus-free chickens 
and minor poultry to ensure a virus-free environment. 
Universal immunisation against avian influenza of all 
poultry in backyard farms is not feasible, and hence 
immunisation should be preferentially targeted to 
ducks, geese, and chickens in industrial farms. Free 
grazing of ducks and geese outside the pens should 
only be allowed if the birds carry adequate titres of 
neutralising antibodies against H5.
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